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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT
WILL RULE REVISITED: A CHALLENGE TO ITS
ORIGINS AS BASED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ADVANCED CAPITALISM
DeborahA. Ballam*

Legal doctrine... is strongly influenced by economic conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. historiography contains a long tradition of viewing economics

as the causative factor behind historical change, particularly in shaping
the judiciary's role in effecting change within legal doctrines.2 Some

historians have portrayed the judiciary as little more than an instrument
controlled by the needs of the business community.3 The progressive

school of historiography,4 which dominated U.S. history during approximately the first four decades of the twentieth century and continues to
have adherents even today, viewed economics as the causative factor in

history and interpreted U.S. history as a battle between the "people" and
the "business interests"

For example, Vernon Parrington, one of the

* Associate Professor, The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business; B.A., M.A.,
J.D. The Ohio State University.
1. Jay Feinman, 7he Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT.
118, 135 (1976).
2. See fd.
3. See. e.g., RICHARD HOFsrTADTER Er AL., THE PROGRESE HiSTORIANS 201 (1968)
(asserting the once prevalent view ofjudges as "former corporation lawyers in black robes.").
4. See generally Morton L Horwitz, ProgressiveLegal Historiography,63 OR. L. REv. 679
(1984) (examining the concept of progressive historiography).
5. For a discussion of progressive historiography see HOF1sTADTER, supra note 3. Until the
last decade ofthe nineteenth century, United States historiography was dominated by amateur writers
with no formal training in the writing of history. HOrsTADTER, supra note 3, at 35. In the 1880's
the scientific study of history, whereby historians attempt to describe facts objectively without
romanticizing history or passing judgment on its actors and events, took root at John Hopkins
University. HOFsTADTER, supra note 3, at 38-39. By 1900, this scientific method ofstudying history
had become widespread. HOFSTADTFR supra note 3, at 39. During this same time period in which
the study of history underwent a metamorphosis, the United States experienced dramatic social,
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founders of progressive historiography, examined the role of Chief

Justice John Marshall in U.S. history.6 parrington concluded that Marshall, who served as the Chief Justice from 1801 to 1835, was an

instrument of the monied, propertied classes who was a "reactionary"

with a "hatred of democracy."7 One of the principles which drove

Marshall to such disdain for democracy, Parrington argued, was his belief
in the "sanctity of private property."'

In the struggle between the

interests of business and the people, Marshall sided with business.'
Arnold Paul, a modem historian, continued in the tradition
established by progressive historiography with a 1960 publication that

examined the changes in the law during the late-nineteenth century.'"
Paul, who examined doctrinal developments in the law that occurred
from 1887-1895, argued that during the 1890's the U.S. judiciary
assumed a new importance in addressing social and economic issues by

frequently invalidating legislation as an unconstitutional infringement on
due process."

This occurred, Paul argued, primarily because of

economic, and political changes wrought by industrialization. HOFSTADTER, supra note 3, at 41. It
was within this context (the rise of scientific history and the industrialization of the nation) that
Progressive Historiography arose. HOFSTAnmTR, supra note 3, at 41-42.
Charles Beard, one of the most famous progressive historians, argued that the Constitution
was shaped by needs of the dominant economic interests of the late eighteenth century. CHARLES
A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1935).
6. VERNON L. PARRINGTON, The Romantic Revolution in America, in MAIN CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 20-27 (1927).
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 23-27. The traditional view with regard to Marshall is that he intentionally used his
position on the Court to promote nationalism, which he defined as the promotion of federal governmental power at the expense of the states in a way that preserved what legal scholar E.S. Corwin
has described as the "doctrine of vested rights." Edward S. Corwin, The BasicDoctrine ofAimerican
ConstitutionalLaw, 12 MicH. L. REv. 247,255 (1914). The Supreme Court developed this doctrine,
Corwin concluded, to protect vested property rights "from legislative attack." Id. at 275; see also
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819) (where the Court interpreted a contract clause as protecting corporate charters from legislative interference).
Marshall's place in history has undergone revisions in recent years. Many now believe that
Marshall was not attempting to serve business interests, but rather was attempting to preserve the
republican form of government which he believed demanded protection for vested property rights.
For an extensive discussion of the Marshall era historiography see G. EDvARD WHITE, The Art of
Revising History: Revisiting the MarshallCourt, in INTERVEN7ION AND DETAC iENT, ESSAYS IN
LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 50 (1994).
10. ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATnTUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960).
11. In a series of cases beginning with Chicago,Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota,
the U.S. Supreme Court sanctified liberty of contract and substantive due process as limitations on
state power, limitations that severely undermined the concept of dual federalism and state police
power. St. Paul Ry., 134 U.S. 418 (1890). In the St Paul Ry. case, the Court addressed the
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pressure from the strengthened conservatism of the right wing of the

legal community, a conservatism shaped by the increasing class conflict
and social tensions of the 1890's.2 This crisis of the nineties prompted

the judiciary to intentionally subvert years of precedent by using laissezfaire constitutionalism" to strike down protective legislation and
statutes regulating business activity. Protection of property interests from
the threats of the masses, who were able to pressure legislatures to bow

to their demands, provided the courts' motivation for striking down such
legislation. 4 Paul concluded that in choosing to strike down protective
legislation, a course which the judiciary followed until the mid-1930s, the

courts assumed the role of defender of property rights against the masses.'

5

U.S. legal history since the 1960s has been heavily influenced by
what has come to be called "the new legal history."' 6 The new legal
history, which may be traced to a 1956 publication,17 in combination
constitutionality of a state statute that permitted no judicial review of commission-established rates.
Id. at 447. The Court, adopting the argument that the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed substantive as well as procedural due process, struck down the statute because it deprived
the judiciary of the right to determine the reasonableness of the commission-established rates. Id.
at 458. For many contemporaries ofthe era, as well as subsequent legal scholars, the famed Lochner
case represented the apogee of laissez-faire constitutionalism. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). InLochner,the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York law that limited working
hours for bakers as a violation of freedom of contract. Id. at 64. In his dissent, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes charged that the majority's commitment to the principles of laissez-faire
constitutionalism, as opposed to constitutional principles, had motivated the majority of the Court
to overrule the state statute. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. PAUL, supra note 10, at 234-35 (asserting that the insistence of laissez-faire right wing
conservatives on the judiciary weakened the moderates).
13. An entire sub-debate within the field of legal history has examined the true motives for
laissez-faire constitutionalism, a term whose genesis is rooted in the notion that the action of courts
striking dovm legislation that regulates business activity has resulted in a laissez-faire environment
with respect to the relationship between government and business. Some have argued that thejudiciary simply sided with big business. Others argued that the Court was not siding with business
interests, but instead was attempting to remain true to the Constitution's original intent that government would not permit class legislation - that is, legislation benefitting a particular class at the
expense of another class. Many of the government regulations of this era, including some that were
pro-business, were viewed by the courts as constituting class legislation and hence were invalidated
on constitutional grounds. For an excellent summary of the different interpretations of laissez-faire
constitutionalism, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONsTTUrION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DE MSE OF

LOCHNER ERA PoucE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1-18 (1993).
14. PAuL, supra note 10, at 63-65.
15. PAUL, supra note 10, at 221-22.
16. For an excellent description of the new legal history and how it differs from the old legal
history see Harry N. Scheiber, American ConstitutionalHistoryandthe New LegalHistory: Complementary Themes in Two Modes, 68 J.AM. HIST. 337 (1981).
17. JAMES NV. HURST, LAW AND TnE CONDMONS OF FREEDOM INTHE NmiEE

-CENTURY

UNITED STATES (1956).
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with criticism of the traditional notion of constitutional history,"8 rejects
analyzing legal history by focusing narrowly on changes in legal doctrine
and attempts to place those changes within the social, economic, and
political context within which they occurred.' The new legal history,
then, examines the way in which the law shapes, and is shaped by,
society. Hurst, for example, argued that the dominant factor shaping
U.S. legal change in the nineteenth century was society's desire to
"enlarge the options open to private individual and group energy."'
The "options" to which Hurst referred focused on releasing individual
and group energy to promote the economic development of the country.2 t Thus, legal change in the nineteenth century created a "hospitable
The judiciary, and
environment" for "the new business dynamics."
particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, in Hurst's view, played a key role
in allowing this release of energy to occur.3
Lawrence Friedman produced the next major work on the new legal
history, a synthesis of U.S. legal history from colonial times through the
mid-twentieth century?4 One of the dominant themes of this work was
the way in which business' needs and the needs of a developing
economy shaped the course of U.S. legal developments. 5 For example,
Friedman concluded that common law developments in the area of torts,
particularly negligence, were shaped by the need of developing businesses to have limitations placed on their liability.2 6 The doctrines of duty
of care and proximate cause, which Friedman concluded were developments of the mid-nineteenth century, were judicial attempts to create a
more favorable environment for business development2 7
In 1977, Morton Horwitz published what has become one of the
most often-cited works within the tradition of the new legal history that

18. See Scheiber, supra note 16, at 338-40.
19. See generally HURST,supra note 17, at 33-70 (discussing the control of environment and
its impact on changes in legal doctrine); see also Scheiber, supra note 16, at 340 (observing that

Hurst contends that "the history of the legal system should be considered.
framework that reflected [the] laws of real life functions'3.
20. HURST, supra note 17, at 39.

. . by

use of analytic

21. HURST, supra note 17, at 44.
22. HURST, supra note 17, at 45.
23. HURST, supra note 17, at 45-46.

24. LAwRENcE M. FREDMAN, A HiSTORY OF Ai1RicAN LAW (1973).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 467.
27. See id. at 411-12. The author argues that business instruments, such as the bill of lading
and the certified check, were invented by business and allowed by the courts. Id. at 468.
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focuses on economics as the causative factor of U.S. legal change. 8 In
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, Horwitz examined changes
in U.S. common law that occurred from the late-eighteenth through the
mid-nineteenth centuries. He concluded that during this time dramatic
changes occurred in common law doctrine, particularly in the areas of
contract and property law?9 Horwitz further concluded that the judges
who effected these changes did so with the intent of creating a favorable
environment for business growth30 During the first half of the nineteenth century, the law was transformed so as to enable "emergent
entrepreneurial and commercial groups to win a disproportionate share
of wealth and power in American society," and thus the law, as shaped
by the judiciary, "became a major instrument in the hands of these newly
powerful groups."31
Some legal scholars have shared in the approach taken both by the
progressive school of historiography and by the new legal history's
economic interpretation of legal change. Critical legal studies scholars
such as Karl Klare, for example, have provided analyses of the law that
are consistent with historians who view the needs of the business community as a dominant factor driving the way in which the judiciary
shapes U.S. law.32 In a series of articles Klare provided his analysis of
the impact of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")33 on the U.S.
28. MoRTON J. HoRvWir, THTRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860(1977). This
work has been cited, for example, in John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse
Possession, 79 CoRNEL. L. REv. 816, 844 (1994); Steve Thel, Regulation of ManipulationUnder
Section 10 (b):Security Pricesand the Text ofthe Security FechangeAct of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 359, 365-66 (1988); Joan C. Williams, The Invention ofthe Municipal Corporation:A Case
Study in Legal Change, 34 Am. U. L. REv. 369, 392 (1985).
29. MORTON J. HoRAvrrz, THE TRANSFORMA oN op AmEpiCAN LAW, 1780-1860 at xii-xv
(1977).
30. Id. Horwitz described the role ofjudges as follows:
What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century
counterpart was the extent to which common law judges came to play a central role in
directing the course ofsocial change. Especially during the period before the Civil War,
the common law performed at least as great a role as legislation in underwriting and
channeling of economic development. In fact, common law judges regularly brought
about this sort of far reaching changes that would have been regarded earlier as entirely
within the powers of the legislature.... Indeed, judges gradually began to shape common law doctrine with an increasing awareness that the impact... had expanded beyond
the necessity merely of doing justice in the individual case.
Id. at 1-2.
31. Id.at xvi.
32. See THE PoLrncs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRIMiQUE (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990)
(discussing critical legal studies, as well as providing examples of works by critical legal studies
scholars).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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labor movement.34

lare's thesis is that while the NLRA itself had the

potential to affect radical change upon society, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the NLRA in such a way as to subvert that radical potential

and instead to turn that statute into a law that, in the name of industrial
peace, served management's goals.3 s

Both historians and legal scholars who argue that changes in U.S.
legal doctrine have been shaped by the judiciary's desire to promote a
favorable climate for business development have received sharp

criticisms for their analyses and conclusions.3 6 While one may debate

the legitimacy of some of these criticisms, there is one criticism that
often appears to be well justified. The historians and legal scholars who
have reached broad conclusions about the desire of the judiciary to
change the law so as to support a favorable business climate have relied
on an inadequate sampling of cases. For example, one of the radical

transformations in contract law cited by Morton Horwitz was that U.S.
courts began to refuse to invalidate contracts based on inadequacy of
consideration. 7 However, Horwitz based this conclusion on five
Pennsylvania cases and two Massachusetts cases3 ' In order to arrive
34. See, e.g., Karl Kiare, JudicialDeradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MIN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (discussing the
transformation of the labor movement and judicial treatment of that movement after the passage of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935); Karl Kare, LaborLaw as Ideology: Toward a New
Historiographyof Collective BargainingLaw, 4 INDUS. REL. LJ. 450 (1981) (discussing the newly
emerging historiography of post-New Deal United States collective bargaining law and the
contributions made by critical labor law); Karl Klare, TraditionalLabor Law Scholarship and the
Crisis of Collective BargainingLam: .4 Reply to ProfessorFinkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985)
(explaining how his view differs from traditionalism, and encourages innovative approaches to
industrial democracy and rebutting as fundamentally misstated the conclusions of Professor Finkin);
KARL KLARE, CriticalTheory andLaborRelationsLaw in THE POLMCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRrrIQUE (David Kairys, ed., 2d ed. 1990).
35. See Karl Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
BargainingLaw, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 452-53 (1981).
36. See eg., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common LawBackgroundofNineteenth Century Tort
Law, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 1127 (1990) (discussing evolution of tort law and how historians have
interpreted it); KEVIN M. TEVEEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACrs (1990); Matthew W. Finkin, Revisionism in LaborLaw, 443 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984)
(criticizing the revisionist publications of Karl Klare and other legal scholars); Gary T. Schwartz,
Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:A Reinterpretation,90 YALE LJ. 1717
(1981) (criticizing the views of Professors Gregory and Horwitz); A.W. Brian Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979) (discussing Horowitz' theories
and their application to the law of contracts).
37. HoRwrrz, supra note 28, at 177-85. Horwitz's discussion of the topic in this volume is
based on an article that he previously published. See Morton J. Horowitz, The Historical
FoundationsofModern ContractLaw, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974).
38. Morton J. Horwitz, TheHistoicalFoundationsofModernContractLamv,87 HARV. L. R.EV.
917, 924-26 (1974); see also A.W. Brian Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis andthe History of Contracts,
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at any valid conclusions, especially regarding common law developments,
one must perform a more comprehensive assessment of the case law.
The purpose of this article is to perform such a comprehensive
assessment with respect to the employment at will doctrine. Since the
1970s, the erosion of the employment at will rule has attracted substantial
scholarly attention 9 While few of these examinations of the erosion
of the rule devote much discussion to the rule's origins, nearly all
contain, with no case precedent to support it what has become the
standard short statement that the rule was suddenly adopted by the U.S.

46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 575-80 (1979) (discussing Horowitz' conclusions).
39. See, eg., John D. Blackburn, Resuticted EmployerDischargeRights: A ChangingConcept
ofEmployment at Will, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 467 (1980) (discussing judicial recognition of the need to
protect against the wrongful discharge of an employee at will); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment
at Will vs. IndividualFreedom:On Limiting The Abusive Exercise ofEmployer Power,67 COLUM.
L. REv. 1404 (1967) (discussing the need for government intervention in the area of employment
to protect employees from the power of large corporations in their largely absolute right of
discharge); Elletta S. Callahan, The PublicPolicyException to the Employment at Will Rule Comes
of Age, 29 AM. Bus. LJ.481 (1991) (discussing the elements that comprise a wrongful discharge
claim); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense ofthe Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 946 (1984) (discussing the utility of the employment at will doctrine); Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization
of Work: Employer Policiesand ContractLaw, 1986 WiSc. L. REV. 733 (1986) (arguing that courts
have applied contract law to employment practices which have dramatically changed over time and
are not refashioning the law on this subject); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Causefor
Termination Rules andEconomic Ericiency,38 EMORY L.L 1097 (1989) (arguing against the need
for governmental review of employer decisions in the employment at will relationship because it
would be too costly to society); S. Maya Iwanaga, A ComparativeApproach to Japanese& United
States Wrongful TerminationLaw, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 341 (1989) (discussing the
employment at will doctrine in both countries and arguing that the United States may learn from the
Japanese model ofstriving to guarantee "lifetime employment'); Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging
Law of Wrongful Discharge--A QuadrennialAssessment ofthe LaborLaw Issue ofthe 180s, 40 Bus.
LAW 1 (1984) (discussing various issues that would arise if the traditional employment at will rule
was changed); Jane P. Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge and the Emerging Common Law of
Wrongful Discharge,28 ARIZ. L. REv. 651 (1986) (arguing that common law remedies in cases of
discriminatory discharge further the policies that underlie both employment discrimination statutes
and the common law of wrongful discharge); Ellen R. Pierce, et al., Employee Termination at Will:
A PrincipledApproach,28 VILL.L. REv. 1 (1982) (arguing for the abandonment ofthe employment
at will rule and the adoption of a dual level dispute resolution mechanism); Michael J.Phillips,
Toward A Middle Way in the PolarizedDebate Over Employment at Will, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 441
(1992) (discussing the ethical considerations of the employment at will doctrine and attempting to
find a middle ground suitable for both employers and employees); J.Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune,
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) (arguing that the
employment at will doctrine rests on a questionable justification); Todd M. Smith, Note, Wrongful
DischargeReexamined: The CrisisMatures,Ohio Responds, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1209 (1991)
(arguing that Ohio courts should abandon the employment at will rule); Clyde IV. Summers,
Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Tune for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976)
(arguing that the "anachronistic legal rule that employees can be discharged for any reason or no reason should be abandoned and the protection now given by arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements should be extended to employees not covered by collective agreements.').
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judiciary in response to the demands of the late-nineteenth century's
increasingly industrialized society.40

The traditional version of the

adoption suggests that treatise writer Horace Wood simply created the
rule in 1877,41 and judges readily adopted it in an attempt to support the
business community's need for flexible employment relationships.4 2
Few of these works, however, seriously examine the rule's origins.

Marxist scholar Jay Feininan's article The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule provided the first attempt to seriously examine
the historical context within which the rule developed and to provide an
explanation as to why the courts so readily adopted the principle stated
in Wood's treatise.4 3 Mid-level managers first appeared in the work

40. See Michael J. Philips, Towarda Middle Way in the PolarizedDebate Over Employment
at Will, 30 Am. Bus. LJ. 441, 444.45 (1992).
Subject to certain exceptions, medieval English courts usually construed an indefiniteterm employment contract as a hiring for one year. Some nineteenth century American
courts continued this construction. Others rejected it while still finding indefinite-term
employment contracts obligatory for some period orundersome circumstances. Not until
the last quarter of the nineteenth century did courts begin to read such contracts as
terminable at will.
Id.
41. Id. at 445. See also HoRACE G. WOOD, A TREATSiE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (Albany, Parsons 1877).
42. See John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer DischargeRights: A Changing Concept of
Employer at Will, 17 AM. Bus. LJ. 467, 467-68 (1980).
The latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of economic uncertainty. Businessmen of that era faced many risks when launching their enterprises. Confronted with
the common phenomenon of business failure, the economic, political, and social
environment fostered practices protecting the employer, and through him the economy,
from undue hardship. One practice was of such legal significance that to this day it
carries great momentum. This practice is employment at will.
Id. at 467.
43. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
118 (1976). Subsequent to the publication of Feinman's article, other scholars have examined the
issue of the doctrine's origins. Industrial relations scholar Sanford Jacoby acknowledged that, prior
to the issuance of Wood's treatise in 1877, many U.S. courts did not follow the annual hiring rule,
although Jacoby agrees with Feinman's basic analysis that the employment at will doctrine was not
the generally accepted rule until the period of 1890 to 1910. Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of
Indefinite Employment Contracts in the UnitedStates and England:An HistoricalAnalysis, 1982
CoMp. LAB. L. 85, 115-16 (1982).
Legal scholars Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby questioned the traditional view that
wood simply made up the employment at will rule in his 1877 treatise. Mayer G. Freed & Daniel
D. Polsby, The Doubcul Provenanceof "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 551, 551-52
(1990). Freed and Polsby found several pre-1877 cases that they interpreted as following the
employment at will doctrine. Id. at 554-55. However, they did not conduct any comprehensive
analysis.
In a 1994 article, Andrew P. Morriss argued that courts adopted the employment at will
doctrine in the late-nineteenth century to serve a gatekeeper function and not because of the needs
of developing businesses. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
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force in significant numbers during the last three decades of the
nineteenth century4 Feinman's thesis is that the judiciary adopted the
employment at will rule to defeat the efforts of these mid-level managers,41 to obtain the protection of the annual hiring rule.4 6 By denying
any job permanence or job security to mid-level managers, the courts
thereby guaranteed to employers maximum freedom to control the work
place:
Employment at will is the ultimate guarantor of the capitalist's
authority over the worker. The rule transformed long-term and semipermanent relationships into non-binding agreements terminable at will.
If employees could be dismissed on a moment's notice, obviously they
could not claim a voice in the determination of the conditions of work
or the use of the product of their labor.47
Employment at will, Feinman concluded, was adopted to support
"the dominion of the owners of capital over their employees and their
enterprises.., a basic element of the capitalist system."' 8 Feinman
arrived at this conclusion after examining the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century New York cases that expressly announced the employment at will principle. Feinman chose New York because it was at
that time both an important commercial state and an important contributor in forming the common law. 9 Feinman asserted that the development of New York case law was "typical of other states" and hence "is
an appropriate vehicle for tracing the way the employment at will rule
came to be dominant," although he provides no authority to support this
proposition5 0
Feinman concluded that prior to 1894, the New York courts often
applied the English rule of annual hirings.51 Under this rule, the
employment relationship was assumed to exist for one year, during which

Reassessment of the Rise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 681-82 (1994). However,

Morriss did not question the assumption that employment at will was a late-nineteenth century development. Id. at 698.
44. See AMANDA BENtt'r, THE DEATH OF THE ORGANIZATION MAN 67 (1990) (discussing
how factories increased the need for middle level managers).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,
Feinman, supra note 43,

at 133.
at 133.
at 132-33.
at 133.
at 127.
at 127.
at 127.
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time neither party could terminate the relationship, absent just cause.5 2
However, the courts inconsistently decided those cases where the parties
expressly agreed to one year contracts and the employees continued
working beyond that year without renewing their contracts. Some courts
found an implied extension for the original time period agreed upon53
while others found the employment relationship terminable at will.54
However, Feinman concluded that in 1895, the New York Court of
Appeals "settled the issue" by expressly applying Wood's rule in Martin
v. New York Life Insurance Co." The plaintiff in Martin was a highlevel management employee who had worked for the company for eleven6
years and made $10,000 per year, a substantial salary for the 1890s.
In April 1892, Martin received notice that the company was discharging
him at the end of the month.' Martin, who was paid on a monthly
basis, received his salary for April. 8 When the company refused to pay
him for the remainder of the year, Martin filed a breach of contract action, alleging that his employment contract with the company was a
yearly contract 9 In rejecting Martin's claim, the New York Court of
Appeals found that absent evidence that the parties actually intended a
yearly contract, a salary stated at an annual rate was insufficient to
establish such a contract.60 Further, the court cited Wood's Rule as authority for the proposition that a general hiring, for which no duration
was stated, was an "indefinite hiring" that was "determinable at will by
61
either party."
Upon examining Martin and subsequent New York cases that raised
the issue of employment duration, Feinman discovered that the plaintiffs
were neither common laborers nor domestic workers, but rather mid-level

52. Feinman, supra note 43, at 127.

53. See, e.g., Greer v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 18 Jones & S. 517 (1884).
54. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.

118, 128 (1976); see also Tucker v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 6 N.Y.S. 134, 135

(1889).

55. 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895); Feinman, supra note 54, at 128.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Martin, 42 N.E. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

In England [under Wood's Rule] it is held that a general hiring, by the terms of which

no time is fixed, is a hiring by the year... [but in the United States] the rule is
inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is, prima facie, a hiring at will; and if the
servant seeks to make out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.
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employees who were relatively well-paid in comparison to the average
worker of that time period. 62 Feinman concluded that:
The employment at will rule developed in America in response to cases
presented by a particular group of workers--middle-level managers.
The overriding factor making the rule compelling was the position of
these workers as an example of all workers in the developing modem
capitalist economy. Seen thus, the rule is more than a particular
response of the legal system to a particular economic problem; termination at will is the law's development of a fundamental principle of
the economy.6
Thus, in Feinman's view, the changing needs of capitalists, which was
brought about by industrialization, was the causative factor leading the
judiciary to adopt the employment at will principle.'
Feinman's conclusion that employment at will was adopted suddenly
in the late-nineteenth century to support capitalist control over the
workplace is based on three assertions.6' First, Feinman asserts that
New York often applied the annual hiring rule prior to 1894, yet he cites
only two cases66 to support this conclusion. Other than the two cases
that led him to conclude that New York courts often applied the annual
hiring rule prior to 1895,67 Feinman did not do any further analysis of
the historical development of employment law in New York as it relates
to the issue of duration of contracts. Second, Feinman asserts that the
1895 Martin case effected a dramatic change in New York law because
New York's highest court adopted Wood's rule in this case.68 He
arrives at this conclusion because this is the first case in which the New
York Court of Appeals made express reference to Wood's rule.69 Third,
Feinman asserts that a change in the legal status of middle-level
management employees occurred in the late-nineteenth century whereby
courts rejected the application of the annual hiring rule to these

62. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.

118, 127 (1976).
63. Id. at 118.
64. Id. at 131-32.
65. Id. at 133-34.
66. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1891) (affirming judgment that plaintiff's contract
was renewed for one year); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857) (holding that an indefinite hiring
is taken to be a hiring for a year, or from year to year).
67. Feinman, supra note 62, at 127.
68. Feinman, supra note 62, at 128-29.
69. See Feinman, supra note 62, at 128.
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workers. 0 He bases this conclusion on his analysis of thirty cases that
arose in New York during the two decades after the issuance of Martin.
These cases dealt with the duration of employment contracts. 7'
This article will revisit these three assertions as well as Feinman's
ultimate conclusion. The first part will examine Feinman's assertion that
New York courts often applied the annual hiring rule prior to 1895.72
The second part will focus on his finding that Martin effected a dramatic
change in New York law.73 The third part will address whether a
radical change in the law regarding the duration of employment contracts
for middle-management employees did occur in the late-nineteenth
century.74 The conclusion of this article is that Feinman was wrong on
all three counts. There is little evidence that New York followed the
annual hiring rule at any time in its history. Indeed, the historical
evidence suggests the contrary - New York always followed the
employment at will doctrine. Thus, Martin did not effect a dramatic
change in New York law and no radical change occurred in the latenineteenth century with respect to the duration of employment contracts
for middle-management employees.

II. THE ANNUAL HIRING RULE INNEW YORK PRIOR TO 1895
The traditional view is that the English annual hiring rule was
brought to this country during colonial times and remained unchanged
until the late-nineteenth century when U.S. courts adopted the employment at will doctrine. 5 Feinman stated that prior to the nineteenth
century, the colonists generally applied the annual hiring rule to
76
agricultural and domestic workers, but excluded day laborers.
However, in the nineteenth century, Feinnan noted that "whatever
consensus existed about the state of the law dissolved."1 Feinman
arrived at this conclusion based on a reading of the nineteenth century
treatises that dealt with master-servant law.?8 One 1846 treatise noted

70. Feinman, supra note 62, at 132-33.
71. Feimnan, supra note 62, at 128.
72. See Feinman, supra note 62, at 127-28.
73. See Feinman, supra note 62, at 128-29.
74. See Feinman, supra note 62, at 132-35.
75. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
76. Feinman, supra note 62, at 122.
77. Feinman, supra note 62, at 122.
78. Feinman, supranote 62, at 122-24. One explanation for the confusion in the law could be
rooted in the treatises that were available during the first two-thirds of the 19th century. Many of
them were English treatises with American footnotes. See, eg., CHARLES M. SMrH, A TREATISE
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that the annual hiring rule did not apply in Connecticut, 79 while Smith's
treatise on master-servant law,80 which was published in 1852 and
represented the first treatise devoted to U.S. law on the topic, noted that
there was a "presumption that a general hiring was a yearly hiring for all
servants."' This presumption was rebuttable by evidence to the contrary.8' However, based on a 1857 New York case, Davis v. Gorton, 3
Feinman concluded that New York followed the English annual hiring
rule.' A review of New York law from the colonial period to 1895,
however, suggests that the Davis case was inaccurate. New York did not
generally follow the annual hiring rule at .any time in its history.
Although one may find isolated examples of lower courts applying the
rule,85 New York colonial law, the decisions of New York's highest
courts Davis notwithstanding, and a review of other historical evidence
supports the conclusion that New York, beginning in colonial times,
always followed the employment at will rule 36
ON TIE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (Philadelphia, T. & J.\V. Johnson 1852); C.G. ADDISON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RIGHTS AND LIABILXIEs (2d ed. 1857). The text for
both of these treatises summarized English law. The footnotes, however, were divided between
English case references and U.S. case references. IfU.S. law diverged from English law, that divergence would be discovered not by reading the text, but by reading the U.S. footnotes. Smith's treatise provides a discussion on annual hiring rule: "Where no time is limited either expressly or by
implication, for the duration of a contract of hiring and service, the hiring is considered as a general
hiring and, in point of law, a hiring for a year." CHARLES M. SwiTH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANTr 53 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1852). While this is a statement
indicating that the annual hiring rule is the law, Smith only cites English cases in the footnotes to
support this proposition. Id. If one were to read only the text, and not the footnotes, one would assume that the annual hiring rule applied in the U.S.
79. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN

AND wARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 347 (1846).
80. CHARLES M. SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (Philadelphia,
T. & J.W. Johnson 1852).
81. Id. at 41.
82. Id. at 47; see also Feinman, supra note 62, at 123.
83. 16 N.Y. 235 (1857) (holding that the English rule of yearly hiring was still in effect in New
York).
84. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 123 (1976).
85. See, eg., Greer v. People's Tel. Co., 50 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 517 (App. Div. 1884) (holding that
remaining in service for any time past the completion of a yearly contract by the consent of an employer renews the contract for one year).
86. A more detailed discussion of the historical development of employment-at-will in New
York can be found in Deborah A. Ballam, The TraditionalView on the Origins ofthe Employmentat-Will Doctrine: Myth or Reality?, 33 AM. Bus. L. 1 (1995). This article also examines the
development of the law in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. In a subsequent article,
Deborah A. Ballam, Explodingthe OriginalMyth RegardingEmployment-at-Will: The True Origins
ofthe Doctrine,BERKELEY J.EMPL. AND LAB. LAWV,
(forthcoming 1996), I examined five additional
states: Georgia, Illinois, Texas, Montana, and California. My conclusions in the two articles are the
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Because no legal tradition existed in the colonies at the time of their
founding, colonial law was largely codified law. 7 The New York
colony's codification contained laws regulating the master-servant

relationship. 8 However, these statutes made no mention of the duration
of the employment term for free laborers.

The absence of such a

provision is significant because for a brief duration, the Massachusetts
colonial codification contained a provision adopting the annual hiring
rule. 89 One reasonable conclusion that can be derived from the absence

of the annual hiring rule from a New York's statute regulating relations
between employer and employee is that colonial New York lawmakers
intentionally rejected the annual hiring rule in favor of employment at
will. Such a conclusion is consistent with actual employment practices,
as will be discussed later.90
A review of cases from New York's highest courts, issued after
New York became a state, also suggests that the annual hiring rule was

same. With the exception of a short period of time in colonial Massachusetts, these nine states
generally followed the employment at will doctrine beginning in colonial times. Thus, the doctrine
was not suddenly initiated by late-19th century jurists intent on creating a more favorable climate
for industrialization. Rather, employment at will was adopted in colonial times in response to the
unique economic conditions in the colonies created by the ready availability of free land, a severe
labor shortage, and high labor costs. Laborers who could easily obtain free land wanted to work
only long enough to accumulate enough capital to start their own farms and thus did not want to be
bound to a long-term employment relationship. Employers also did not want to be bound to a longterm relationship because of the high costs of labor caused by the labor shortage. In addition,
employers vho did want permanence in their labor force used either slaves or indentured servants.
The widespread use of slaves and indentured servants, which comprised up to two thirds of the
colonial labor force militated against the development of the annual hiring rule. Neither slaves nor
indentured servants would have been affected by an automatic rule of annual hiring because slavery
was not a contractual relationship and indentured servants had express contracts for specified
durations.
87. LAWRENCE FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 78 (1973).
88. See The Duke ofYork's Lavs, 1665-75, in EARLIEST PRINTED LAW OF NEv YORK, 16651693, at 110, 151-52 (John D. Cushing ed. 1978).
89. A Massachusetts colonial court in 1631 held that servants had to be hired for a time period
of not less than one year. 2 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSISTANIS OF THE COLONY OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1630-92, at 15 (1904). However, although a compilation of Massachusetts'
colonial laws as of 1660 contained detailed regulations on wages, the workday, and other aspects
of the master-servant relationship, it made no mention of the annual hiring rule. THE COLONIAL
LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, 174-75 (Rockwell & Churchill 1889) (1660). See also MASSACHUSE-rs
PROVINCE LAvs, 1692-1699 (John D. Cushing, ed. 1978) (containing no law incorporating the
English annual hiring rule). Thus, it appears that Massachusetts dropped the English annual hiring
rule. The reported cases for Massachusetts after it became a state support the conclusion that
Massachusetts no longer followed the annual hiring rule. For a more detailed discussion of
Massachusetts' developments see Deborah A. Ballam, The Traditional View on the Originsof the
Employment at Will Doctrine:Myth or Reality?, 33 AM. Bus. LJ. 1 (1995).
90. See infra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
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not utilized in New York at any time during the nineteenth century.

From 1799, when New York decisions began to be reported, until the
issuance of Martin in 1895, the state's highest courts issued twenty-seven

decisions that addressed the employment relationship. Seven involved
the "entire contracts" issue of whether when a fixed duration for the
employment contract does exist, do employees sacrifice their wages when
they leave prior to the expiration of the contract term.9 '

Eight were

wrongful discharge actions alleging termination prior to the expiration of
the fixed term of the contract,92 and the remaining twelve dealt with a
variety of employment issues. 3

91. Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197 (1859) (holding that where performance is rendered impossible by the death of a party, recovery may be had for actual labor done); Monell v. Bums, 4
Denio 121 (N.Y. 1847) (holding that where a party contracts to work for a fixed period and resigns
without cause before the expiration of the term, that party may not recover for work completed);
Marsh v. Rulesson, I Wend. 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1828) (holding that the period of service for a
contract is a condition precedent to be performed before payment for service can be demanded);
Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (holding that in a fixed period employment
contract, the work for the whole period is a condition precedent to be performed before a party can
sue for hire); Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cow. 63 (N.Y. 1827) (holding that where a party abandons performance of a contract without cause, that party cannot maintain an action for labor actually
performed); Thorpe v. white, 13 Johns. 53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding that in the context of a
fixed period employment contract, the servant cannot recover wages until the servant has served the
whole period); M'Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. 165 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (holding that a contract
for a specified period is entire and must be performed as a condition precedent before an action can
be brought for labor completed).
92. Linton v. Unexcelled Fireworks Co., 124 N.Y. 533 (1891) (holding that the burden is on
an employer Io justify the dismissal df an employee prior to the expiration of the fixed term of a
contract); Paine v. Howells, 90 N.Y. 660 (1882) (holding that an employer waives its right to declare
a forfeiture of compensation when it does not discharge an employee for just cause); Emerson v.
Powers, 89 N.Y. 527 (1882) (holding that an employee may bring an action for wrongful dismissal
prior to the expiration of the term of the contract); Parry v. Dickerson, 85 N.Y. 345 (1881) (holding
that a judgment for wrongful dismissal does not bar subsequent action for wages earned prior to the
wrongful dismissal); Gifford v. Waters, 67 N.Y. 80 (1876) (holding that a wrongfully discharged
employee may recover damages estimated from criteria fixed in the contract); Howard v. Daly, 61
N.Y. 362 (1875) (holding that where an employer repudiates a contract, the employee may recover
damages for breach of the contract); Costigan v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 2 Denio 77 (N.Y. 1846)
(holding that where an employer wrongfully discharges an employee before the expiration of a fixed
term, it is generally bound to pay the full amount of the contracted wages); Haywood v. Miller, 3
Hill 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (holding that a servant has an action in assumpsit for breach of contract
when evicted from quarters provided for in the employment contract).
93. Douglass v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484 (1890) (holding that an employer may
discharge an employee at any time provided that no contract exists abridging the employer's right
of removal); Lacy v. Gettman, 119 N.Y. 109 (1890) (holding that the death of an employer
terminates the employment contract, allowing the employee to recover only the proportionate amount
earned at the time of the death); In re Gardner, 103 N.Y. 533 (1886) (holding that a statute of
limitations precludes recovery for any services rendered more than six years before a partial payment
was made); Turnerv. Kouwenhoven, I00 N.Y. 115 (1885) (holding that no recovery can be had for
partial performance of a contract unless performance was prevented by an act of God or some other
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These cases are notable because not one of them applied the annual
hiring rule. Further, they illustrate the widespread use in the nineteenth

century of express contracts, specifying the term of labor, even for
unskilled positions. This practice was consistent with an economy
characterized by a scarcity of labor, which existed throughout much of
the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries in all of North
America. 94 Employers were anxious to ensure themselves a labor
supply for a fixed period and attempted to bind their employees by
express contracts.95 Moreover, while some of these contracts were for a
term of one year, others varied widely - ten and a half months,16 eight
months,97 fourteen days,9s seven months99 - suggesting that some

employers were willing to be bound to contracts only for the specific
period needed, rather than an automatic one year period.
Although the earliest reported New York case that addressed the
issue of duration of contracts was issued in 1 8 1 5 ,111 it was not until the
1857 case of Davis v. Gorton,10 1 that the New York courts even

mentioned the existence of an annual hiring rule. While the language in
Davis indicates that New York followed the English annual hiring

sufficient legal excuse); Swift v. City of New York, 83 N.Y. 528 (1881) (holding that the police
department of the City of New York is merely a subdivision of the City government and therefore
cannot be sued upon a liability incurred through it; the remedy is by mandamus); Weed v. Burt, 78
N.Y. 191 (1879) (holding that a wrongfully dismissed employee has an action for damages for
breach ofthe contract); Smith v. Velie, 60 N.Y. 106 (1875) (holding that in an employment at will
situation, subsequent agreements fixing wages for a specified period do not raise the presumption
that future wages will be the same); Huntington v. Claffin, 38 N.Y. 182 (1868) (holding that
dismissal for just cause works the forfeiture as a voluntary abandonment of service); Bergin v.
Wemple, 30 N.Y. 319 (1864) (holding that an employer, upon a promise ofcompensation, is liable
in an action for work and labor performed); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857) (holding that if
services are performed under a general retainer, the law will regard the hiring as year to year);
Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio 375 (N.Y. Sup. C. 1846) (holding that an infant may recover for partial
performance even if he leaves the employment without cause); Woodward v. Washbum, 3 Denio 369
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) (holding that an employer may sue for the loss of the employee's services
where that loss is caused by imprisonment of the employee).
94. See MARcus W. JERNEGAN, LABORING AND DEPENDENT CLASSES INCOLONIAL AMERICA,
1607-1783, at 55 (1931); PAUL W. GATES, THE FARMERS AGE: AGRICULTURF, 1815-1860, at 271-78
(1960).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See generally GATES, supra note 94, at 271-75.
See, e.g., M'Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. 165, 166 (N.Y. 1815).
See, eg., Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1822).
See, eg., Marsh v. Rulesson, 1 Wend. 515 (N.Y. 1828).
See, eg., Monell v. Bums, 4 Denio 121, 122 (N.Y. 1847).
See M'Milan, 12 Johns. 165 (N.Y. 1815).
16 N.Y. 255 (1857).
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rule,'0 z3 as Feinman concluded, the case itself does not apply the
10
rule.
The point at issue in Davis was not the duration of an employment
contract. Rather, the issue was whether the Davis family, which had
lived on and worked Mrs. Davis' father's farm for thirteen years with no
express agreement and without receiving any compensation, could collect
from the father's estate for services performed."° The precise legal
issue in the case was whether New York's six-year statute of limitations,
which began to run at the termination of the contract, prohibited recovery
for the entire thirteen years of work or for merely the first seven years
of work."'5 To resolve this issue, the court had to determine the
termination date of the contract. If it were viewed as a single thirteen
year contract, then the statute of limitations would not operate to bar
recovery for any part of the claim. 0 6 If, however, it were viewed as
thirteen one-year contracts, then the statute of limitations would bar
recovery for the first seven annual contracts.'0 7 The court rejected the
argument that this was one thirteen-year contract because such a contract
would have been extremely unusual. 0 8 Rather, in determining that this
was a series of thirteen one-year contracts, the court compared the Davis'
arrangement to "the hiring of clerks, servants in husbandry and other
similar employments, in which... to give each party the benefit of all
the seasons during the year, an indefinite hiring is taken to be a hiring,
for a year, or from year to year .... ,,9 The court cited two English
cases," but no U.S. nor New York cases, to support the assertion that
the annual hiring rule applied in New York.
Although the court in Davis clearly made reference to the annual
hiring rule,'" the case itself is not an example of an application of the
rule. Furthermore, subsequent New York cases did not regard Davis as
having adopted the annual hiring rule. Until the issuance of the 1895
Martin"' decision, Davis was cited eight times by New York courts,

102. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
118, 127 (1976).
103. Id. at 127-28.
104. Davis, 16 N.Y. at 256.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 257.
108. Id. at 256-57.
109. Id. at 257.
110. Rex v. Marclesfield, 3 Term R. 76 (1789); Baxter v. Nurse, 6 Man. & G. 935 (1844).
111. Davis, 16 N.Y. at 257.
112. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

17

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
[Vol. 13:1

seven of which involved the issue of whether the statute of limitations
had run on claims against estates" 3 and one time in a case involving
the duration of an employment contract.14 The Jagau court, in the
employment contract case, cited Davis to support the proposition that
when no duration is expressly agreed upon but wages are stated on a
monthly basis, a month-to-month contract is created." 5 This case
represented an attempt to determine the parties' intent based upon the
agreed6 payment terms, rather than an application of an automatic hiring
1

rule.

New York's highest court made no further reference to the English
annual hiring rule until the 1891 case of Adams v. Fitzpatrick."78
Adams' initial employment contract specified a duration of one year."
At the end of the first year, Adams continued working for the employer
even though no express extension of the original ,contract was agreed
upon."9 When Adams was dismissed in the middle of the second year,
he sued to secure his salary for the remainder of the year, arguing that
when he began working for the second year, the original contract terms
were automatically renewed. 2 The court agreed with Adams, citing
113. In re Gardner, 9 N.E. 306 (N.Y. 1886) (under six year statute of limitations, where there
was no express agreement regarding time or amount of compensation, plaintiff could recover only
for services rendered during the six years prior to the first payment made); Bumett v. Noble, 5
Redfield 69 (N.Y. Co. Sur. Co. 1880) (where implied contract existed, compensation was barred by
the statute of limitations for services rendered more than six years prior to the death of the testatrix);
In re Teyn, 2 Redfield 306 (N.Y. Co. Sur. Ct. 1876) (where agreement for compensation is found
between estate's executors and another party, the law will find it to be a yearly contract, and the
statute of limitations as to each yearly contract will begin to run at the end of that year); Nicholl v.
Larking, 2 Redfield 236 (N.Y. Co. Sur. Ct. 1876) (absent an agreement to the contrary, an implied
contract for compensation runs from year to year, and the statute of limitations for each contract
begins to run from the end of thaf year); Turner v. Martin, 27 N.Y.S. 661 (Sup. Ct. 1865) (where
the plaintiff delivered to the defendant a brovn stone for a house being constructed, the court held
the law implies a contract immediately upon the delivery of the stone, thus the statute of limitations
begins to run at such time); Rider v. Trotter, 28 N.Y. 385 (1863) (where the plaintiff left certain
chattels in the possession of the defendants under the expectation that the latter would purchase them
and the defendant's agent used the same in their business under the belief that they had been
purchased, the court held that the statute of limitations was no bar to an action for the use of this
property during the six years immediately preceding the commencement of this suit); Carney v.
Wadhaums, 9 N.Y. Civ. Pro. 204 (1885) (where the plaintiff was employed by the deceased, referee
found statute of limitations would bar recovery for work performed more than six years prior to the
death of the testator).
114. Jagau v. Goetz, 32 N.Y.S. 144 (Com. PI. 1895).
115. Id. at 146.
116. See id.
117. 26 N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1891).
118. Id. at 144.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 143.
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Wood's 1877 treatise' as well as a number of cases from New
York'2 and other states"z that held that when parties expressly agree
on contract terms and the services continue beyond the originally-agreed
upon time, the original terms are impliedly renewed. 24 This holding,
however, does not equate to the application of the annual hiring rule,
which is applied absent any original agreement among the parties.
However, the confusion about the Adams case regarding the applicability
of the annual hiring rule arises from dicta which suggested that the
annual hiring rule did apply in New York state.125 To support its
assertion, the Adams court cited two English cases'26 and a U.S. treatise
on master-servant law.27 However, the decision failed to note that
Schouler's treatise specified that the annual hiring rule was based on
English rather than U.S. law. 8 Moreover, although the decision cited
Wood's 1877 treatise for the proposition that a contract is impliedly
renewed once the employee continues working beyond the original
agreed upon time, 29 it failed to note Wood's additional assertion that
employment at will, rather than the annual hiring rule, was the norm in
the U.S. 3 ' Thus, it appears that the dicta in Adams was flawed, and
that it was based on a sloppy reading of the treatises. The discussion of
the annual hiring rule was not necessary in Adams, a point specifically
eluded to by the Martin court.'
It is unclear why the Adams court
even included it within the opinion. The 1895 Martin case, which
specifically rejected the Adams court's discussion of the annual hiring
rule,' thus appeared to adopt the employment at will doctrine. How-

121. HORACE 0. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT (Albany, Parsons 1877).
122. Smith v. Velie, 60 N.Y. 106 (1875); Huntingdon v. Claffin, 38 N.Y. 182 (1904); Greed v.
People's Tel. & Tel. Co., 50 N.Y. Super. Ct. 517 (1884).
123. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bulkley, 48 111.189 (1868); New Hampshire Iron
Factory Co. v. Richardson, 5 N.H. 294 (1830).
124. Adams, 26 N.E. at 145.

125. Id. The court stated that "the rule still is that, if master and servant engage without
mentioning the time or frequency of payment, it is a general hiring, and, in point of law, a hiring
for a year." Id
126. Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. &Adol. 904 (1834) (where the court found a contract for one year
when plaintiff entered the service of the defendant, who agreed to pay the plaintiff a set sum per
month for the first year); Emmens v. Elderton, 4 H.L. Cas. 624 (1853) (where the court found a
promise to employ plaintiff, an attorney, for a term of one year).
127. Adams, 26 N.E. at 144. The court cited JAiEs SCHOuLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
THE DoESmc RELATIONS § 458 (4th ed. 1889).
128. SCHOULER, supra note 127, § 458.

129. Adams, 26 N.E. at 145.
130. VOOD, supra note 121, § 134.
131. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895).
132. Id.
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ever, the twenty-seven New York cases reported prior to Martin,none of
which applied the annual hiring rule, provide substantial evidence that
the rule was not applicable in New York in the first place." Furthermore, the historical evidence regarding actual employment relationships
supports the conclusion that New York did not follow the annual hiring
rule.
Until the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in New York
and indeed throughout the country as a whole, agriculture provided the
bulk of employment opportunities. 34 It was not until 1870 that the
number of non-agricultural workers equaled that of agricultural workers.'35 Evidence regarding employment terms for New York agricultural workers can be found both in the reported cases and in
historical descriptions of agricultural labor.'36 As early as 1815, New
York courts suggested in dicta that agricultural hirings were subject to
express agreement and not to an automatic hiring rule. 3 ' The issue in
M'Millan3 was whether a skilled laborer, who had agreed to work for
a ten and one-half month period, had a right to collect for work done if
he left before the expiration of the agreed upon time period.13 9 In
holding that the entire contract had to be performed before the worker
could sue for wages due, 4 ' the court noted that the policy supporting
its holding was that the employer had a right to the full benefit of the

133. Linton v. Unexcelled Fireworks Co., 124 N.Y. 533 (1891); Lacy v. Geltman, 119 N.Y. 109

(1890); Douglas v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484 (1890); In re Gardner, 103 N.Y. 533 (1886);
Turner v. Kouwenhoven, 100 N.Y. 115 (1885); Emerson v. Powers, 89 N.Y. 527 (1882); Paine v.
Howells, 90 N.Y. 660 (1882); Parry v. Dickerson, 85 N.Y. 345 (1881); Swift v. City of New York,

83 N.Y. 528 (1881); Weed v. Burt, 78 N.Y. 191 (1879); Gifford v. Waters, 67 N.Y. 80 (1876);
Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875); Smith v. Velie, 60 N.Y. 106 (1875); Huntington v. Claffin,

38 N.Y. 182 (1868); Bergin v. Wemple, 30 N.Y. 319 (1864); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197 (1859);
Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1867); Monell v. Bums, 4 Denio 121 (N.Y. 1847); Costigan V.
Mohawk and Hudson ILR, 2 Denio 77 (N.Y. 1846); Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio 375 (N.Y. 1846);

Woodward v. Washburn, 3 Denio 367 (N.Y. 1846); Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill 90 (N.Y. 1842);
Marsh v. Ruleson, I Wend. 515 (N.Y. 1828); Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1822); Lantry v.
Parks, 8 Cow. 63 (N.Y. 1827); Thorpe v. White, 13 Johns. 53 (N.Y. 1816); M'Millan v. Vanderlip,
12 Johns. 165 (N.Y. 1815).

134. See SAMUEL MCKEE, JR., LABOR IN COLONIAL NEv YORK, 1664-1776, at 23 (1935).
135. See CLARENcE H. DANOF, CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE: TiE NORTHERN UNITED STATES,
1820-1870, at 10 (1969).
136. See generally PAUL W. GATES, THE FARMER'S AGE: AGRICULTURE 1815-1860 (1960).

137. See, e.g., M'Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. 165 (N.Y. 1815) (where plaintiff was unable
to recover for work performed because he did not perform the work as agreed upon in the contract).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 166.
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" ' In dicta the court stated that "the general practice, in
bargain made.14
hiring laborers or artisans, is, for 6 or 12 months, at so much per month:
the farmer hires a man for 6 or 12 months, at monthly wages; and he
takes his chance of the good, with the bad months. 1 42 Because the
employer is bound for the agreed upon time, the employee also must be
bound and cannot collect unless the entire contract is performed. 43 In
a specific reference to farm labor, the court noted that to hold otherwise
would disadvantage an employer who had kept the employee on during
slow work periods, only to have the employee leave during the heavy
work season causing the employer to be short-handed. 44
Two aspects of the M'Millan decision provide evidence suggesting
that no automatic hiring rule was recognized in New York. First, the
court's notation that hirings of laborers or artisans usually were for either
six or twelve months suggests that there was no automatic hiring
period. 4 ' If such an automatic period existed, it would be for one time
period. The fact that there is a choice of six or twelve months suggests
that the parties had to agree on a time period. Second, in a discussion
on how to properly interpret the contract, the court noted that the modem
practice is to interpret contracts "according to the real intentions of the6
parties" and not according to "subtle notions" of technical rules.11
This dictates that the clear intentions of the parties also govern the
duration of the contract.
However, because the actual issue in M'Milan was not the annual
hiring rule, one cannot arrive at any definitive conclusions regarding the
existence of that rule based solely on this case. Subsequent agricultural
labor cases, however, support the notion that parties customarily agreed
upon the duration of employment and did not rely on an annual hiring
rule. 47 First, there were no agricultural labor cases which involved an

141. Id. at 167. The Court used the example of a farmer who hires a laborer for one year. Id.
The laborer will perform more work in the summer than in the winter, but the farmer bargains for
work in its entirety. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 166.
144. Id. at 167.
145. See d.
146. Id. at 166.
147. See, e.g., Marsh v. Rulesson, 1 Wend. 515 (N.Y. 1828) (holding that because plaintiff left
employment without cause he was not entitled to recover for work performed); Monell v. Bums, 4
Denio 121 (N.Y. 1847) (based on the plaintiff's seven month employment contract allowing either
party to abandon the agreement if they were dissatisfied, the court held that the plaintiff could not
recover for work after leaving the job without alleging any dissatisfaction); Bergin v. Wemple, 30
N.Y. 319 (1864) (holding that if the helper of a country poor house employs one of the paupers
residing therein to perform services for his individual benefit upon a promise of compensation, the
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alleged breach of the annual hiring rule. Second, three of the six agricultural labor cases that were reported involved express contracts for
specific time periods that were neither for six or twelve months; one was
for fourteen days,'4 8 one for seven months, 149 and one was for eight
months. 5 ' The other three were one-year contracts. Two of these referred to a contract for one year, although the cases do not reflect how
that one-year period was derived.'
The third, however, an 1842
case,152 indicated that the parties had a written contract that specified
53
a one-year term of service.'
The reported cases provide no support for the notion that New York
used the annual hiring rule for agricultural labor. Instead, they affirmatively suggest that the rule did not apply. Historical evidence regarding
agricultural employment practices is consistent with the cases. Farmers'
account books from eighteenth century New York reflect frequent hiring
of agricultural laborers, but only for a few days at a time.Y" The
prevalence of these short-term hirings were likely due to two factors.
First, many eighteenth century farms were small and a permanent labor
force was not needed. 5 5 Second, to the extent that permanent labor
was needed, indentured servants who were bound to multi-year express
contracts and for whom the master generally had to provide only room
and board, but no wages, were readily available to fill the need and were
preferred over hiring (on a long-term basis) free labor which was both

helper is liable in an action for the work and labor performed); Turner v. Houwenhoven, 100 N.Y.
115 (1885) (holding that the general rule is that where a party fails to perform the full term required
by a contract of service, no recovery can be had upon the contract, unless performance was
prevented by an act of God or some other legally sufficient excuse); Lacy v. Gettman, 119 N.Y. 109
(1890) (holding that where the plaintiff sought to recover against the executrix for services
performed for the deceased throughout the whole year, upon the employer's death, the contract was

terminated and the plaintiff was only permitted to recover a proportional amount); Haywood v.
Miller, 3 Hill 90 (N.Y. 1842) (holding that where the employer told a live-in housekeeper to resign
and the employer removed her furniture from his residence, there was not a landlord-tenant
relationship, but one of master-servant, and any action taken should have been for breach of
contract).

148. Marsh v. Rulesson, I Vend. 515 (N.Y. 1828).
149. Monell v. Bums, 4 Denio 121 (N.Y. 1847).
150. Bergin v. Wemple, 30 N.Y. 319 (1864).
151. Turner v. Houwenhoven, 100 N.Y. 115 (1885); Lacy v. Gettman, 119 N.Y. 109 (1890).
152. Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill 90 (N.Y. 1842).
153. Id. at 90.
154. See SUNG BOK KIM, LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEwV YoRK MANORIAL
SOCIErY, 1664-1775, at 132-33 (1978).
155. See generally GATES, supra note 136, at 22-50.
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Evidence from other states is consistent with
scarce and expensive.'
New York practices regarding agricultural laborers. Farms tended to hire
indentired servants for long-term labor and hired free labor only for
shorter periods of time. 157 Although indentured servitude began to fade
by the first third of the nineteenth century t58 there is no evidence to
suggest that farmers' employment practices with respect to free labor
changed in the nineteenth century.
After agriculture, the two other prevalent forms of labor in the
nineteenth century consisted of domestic labor and manual labor - both
skilled and unskilled.5 9 The practice with respect to these categories
of labor appears to have been similar to that of agricultural labor.'60
There is no evidence within the case law or the historical information
that suggests that the annual hiring rule was applied to these categories
of labor. Although dicta in an 1846 case indicated that domestic servants
must be given one month's notice of termination, 16' the only other case
from New York's highest court on the employment term for domestic
servants, issued in 1875, l6" expressly rejected the argument that "a contract from year to year" would be implied for such services absent evidence that this was the parties' intent. 63 Actual employment practices
also provide no evidence that the annual hiring rule applied to domestic
labor. Eighteenth-century employers' diaries described a severe shortage
of domestic servants and complained that because of the shortage,
domestic workers could easily change jobs and did so frequently."
Evidence from the nineteenth century indicates that many domestic

156. See RIcHARDS. DUNN, Senants andSlaves: The Recruitmentand Employment ofLabor,
in Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modem Era 159 (Jack P.

Greene & J.R. Poole, eds. 1984) (stating that prior to 1775, almost half of all laborers who imingrated to North America came as indentured servants).
157. See Deborah A. Ballam, The TraditionalView on the Origins ofthe Employment at Will

Doctrine: Myth or Realiy?, 33 Art. Bus. L.J 1, 8 (1995) [hereinafter The Traditional View]
(discussing Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland case law regarding agricultural workers);
Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the OriginalMyth RegardingEmployment at Will: The True Origins
ofthe Doctrine,BERKLEY J.EMPL. AND LAB. LAW (forthcoming 1996) (discussing Illinois case law

regarding agricultural workers).
158. The Traditional View, supranote 157, at 7.
159. The Traditional View, supra note 157, at 27-30.

160.
161.
162.
163.

The Traditional View, supra note 157, at 30.
Costigan v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 2 Derio 609, 612 (N.Y. 1846).
Smith v. Velie, 60 N.Y. 106 (1875).
Id. at 110.

164. See MARY B. NORTON, LIB1ETY'S DAUGHTEts: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF

A.iERICAN WOMiEN, 1750-1800, at 22-23 (1980) (discussing diaries and letters of women who "did
largely as they pleased, knowing that with the endemic American shortage of labor they could
always find another position.").
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servants remained in their positions for only a few months, and that some
were hired for a short term to perform specific tasks such as "spring
cleaning,'"' 6 while others assisted with domestic chores during the few
months of the harvest season." Historical evidence also suggests that
domestic servants were subject to arbitrary dismissals with no notice
whatsoever, a practice consistent with employment at will.'6 7
Similar evidence exists with respect to manual labor. During both
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, skilled laborers generally were
paid by the piece, and were not considered bound to any term of employment, absent an express contract to the contrary.'" Unskilled laborers
generally worked on a day to day basis and had no job security.'69 In
fact, by the early nineteenth century employers began to prefer free,
unskilled labor over indentured servants because of the absence of longterm commitment to the free laborers.'70 By the 1840s, factory labor
became more prevalent in New York.' 71 Factory employment was tied
to economic conditions and seasonal demands for products with the result
that factory workers were subject to frequent lay-offs.' Employment
at will, then, was always the standard for manual labor.
Even though the dicta in Davis v. Gorton and Adams v. Fitzpatrick
suggests otherwise, there is no evidence in the case law or in the
descriptions of actual employment practices of agricultural laborers,
domestic servants, and manual laborers which would indicate that the
annual hiring rule was applied to any category of free labor in New York
during the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Rather, employment at will
appears to have been the standard practice for all categories of labor
from colonial times through the nineteenth century. Thus, New York,
contrary to Feinman's conclusion, did not follow the annual hiring rule
prior to the 1895 Martin case.

165. FAYE E. DUDDEN, SERVING WOMEN: HOUSEHOLD SERVICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA 49-51 (1983).

166. Id. at 49.
167. CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS INNEWV YORK,1789-1860, at 157
(1987).
168. SAMUEL McKEE, JR., LABOR INCOLONIAL NEv YORK, 1664-1776, at 28 (1935); see also
KEEPERS OF THE REVOLUTION: NEW YORKERS AT WORK IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 85,256-58 (Paul
A. Gilie & Howard B. Rock, eds., 1992).
169. MCKEE, supra note 168, at 46.
170. MCKEE, supra note 168, at 46.
171. See RiCHARD B. STOTT, WORKERS INTHE METROPOUS: CLASS, ETHNICIY, AND YOUTH

INANTmELLUM Naw YORK CmTy 17-20 (1990).
172. Id. at 108-20.
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Ell. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARTIN v. NEW YORK LIFE INs. CO.17 3
Feinman asserted that New York effected a dramatic change in its
law by adopting Wood's employment at will rule in the 1895 case of
Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co.174 However, the preceding
analysis indicates that employment at will was always the standard and
that the Martin case merely articulated a long-standing practice.17
What, then, was the significance of Martin? Although Martin did not
adopt the employment at will principle, it did clarify an important issue
in employment law. Prior to Martin, New York courts differed on how
to interpret an agreement to pay an employee at a rate stated by a
specific time period. Some courts held that a rate stated for a specific
time period equated to a contract for that same period, 76 while others
held that the stated rate was nothing but a payment term that did not
constitute an agreement to employ for a specific length of time."z
In Martin, the New York Court of Appeals settled this issue by
holding that a salary stated at an annual rate did not create a contract for
that same time period. 7 ' In its decision, the court quoted approvingly
from Wood's 1877 treatise:
In England it is held that a general hiring, or a hiring by the terms of
which no time is fixed, is a hiring by the year... With us, the rule is
inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is, prima facie, a hiring at
will; and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve .... A contract to pay one
$2,500 a year for services is not a contract for a year, but a contract to
pay at the rate of $2,500 a year for the services actually rendered, and
is determinable at will by either party. Thus, it will be seen that the
fact that the compensation is measured by so much a day, month, or

173. 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895).
174. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 129 (1976).
175. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Jagau v. Goetz, 32 N.Y.S. 144 (Com. Pl. 1895) (holding that a month-to-month
contract is implied from an agreement to pay wages on a monthly basis).
177. See, eg., Douglass v. The Merchants' Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484 (1890) (holding that the
statement of the salary at an annual basis did not equate to an agreement to employ for the year).
178. Martin, 42 N.E. at 417.
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year does not necessarily make such hiring a hiring for a day, month,
or year, but that in all such cases the contract may be put an end to by
either party at any time, unless the time is fixed, and a recovery had at
the rate fixed for the services actually rendered.' 79
Thus, it is obvious that the decision contains a clear statement of support
for the employment at will doctrine. However, a statement of approval
does not equate to an adoption. The doctrine of employment at will had
The significance of the case,
long been followed in New York.'
however, is that it clarified the legal effect of payment terms. After
Martin, payment terms were to be interpreted as rates of pay and not as
commitments to a fixed duration for an employment contract. 81 This
was a significant decision, but did not represent the dramatic break in the
law as portrayed by Feinman. 82
IV. THE STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS FOR MIDDLE-LEVEL
MANAGERS

Feinman further asserted that Martin signaled the beginning of a
series of cases that effected a dramatic change in the legal treatment of
employment contracts of middle-level managers.'8 3 Before Martin,
Feinman argued, middle-level management employees enjoyed a
"presumption of long-term hiring or reasonable notice."' l" Martin signaled the beginning of a trend whereby "the courts substituted a new
presumption of termination at will."' 85 Feinman concluded that this
change was effected in order to guarantee the "capitalist's authority over
the worker.... If employees could be dismissed on a moment's notice,
obviously they could not claim a voice in the determination of the
86
conditions of work or the use of the product of their labor."'

179. Id.
180. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
181. See Martin, 42 N.E. at 417.
182. Indeed, a majority of states did not change the rate of pay rule until well into the first half
of the twentieth century. Sanford M. Jacoby, The DurationofIndefinite Employment Contractsin
the Unites States and England:An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COmP. LAB. L. 85, 114 (1982). Thus, although the rate of payment rule changed in 1895 for New York's middle-level management
employees, it did not immediately change for middle-level management employees in many other
states. Id. at 114-15.
183. Jay Feinnian, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST.
118, 128 (1976).
184. Id. at 129.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 132-33.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/2

26

Ballam: The Development of the Employment At Will Rule Revisited: A Chall

1995]

Employment At Will Revisited: A Challenge To Its Origins

Feinman's conclusion presumes that capitalists were unable, through contractual arrangements, to escape from the burden of long-term employment contracts with their middle-level managers and required a change
in the law in order to gain this freedom. An analysis of pre-Martincases
from New York which dealt with the employment contracts of middlelevel managers illustrates three points.
First, no reported cases applied the annual hiring rule to middlelevel managers. Second, as was the case with other types of employment
relationships, case law suggests that contracts for middle-level management employees were often express contracts for specific time periods. 7 The same scarcity of labor that promoted the use of express
contracts for agricultural and other types of non-skilled labor in the first
part of the nineteenth century likely accounted for the use of express
contracts for middle-level management employees. For example, an
1871 Connecticut case indicates that a corporation entered into a twoyear express contract with a factory foreman because no competent
foreman "could be had for less than two years."' 8 8 Third, employers
already possessed the legal tools necessary to avoid long-term commitments to their middle-level managers, and no change in the law was
necessary to empower them to dismiss at will. 8 9 Two pre-MartinNew
York cases provide evidence that employers had the ability to negotiate
contracts that gave them the freedom to dismiss at will. In Douglass v.
Merchants' Insurance Co.,"90 the issue was whether a corporate secretary, who had served for twenty-eight years, could be dismissed without
notice and with no pay for the remainder of the year during which he
was terminated.'
In rejecting the employee's claim that he had an
annual contract because his pay was stated on an annual basis, the court
noted that the corporation's 1850 by-laws, which were in effect when the

187. See, a g,Linton v. Unexcelled Fireworks Co., 124 N.Y. 533 (1891) (express written contract
for two and one-half years for a factory superintendent); Drake v. Seaman, 97 N.Y. 230 (1884)
(express contract for three year period for a salesman); Paine v. Howells, 90 N.Y. 660 (1882)
(express contract for two year period for a salesman); Gifford v. Waters, 67 N.Y. 80 (1876) (express
contract for one year period for a clerk).
188. Parry v. Simpson waterproofMfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520, 535 (1871).
189. One might ask why employers needed these contractual tools if the annual hiring rule was
not recognized in New York. While they did not need to protect themselves from the operation of
the annual hiring rule, they could use them to protect themselves against the operation of the
payment of wages rule and the rule that an express contract for a specific period is impliedly
renewed for the same time period if the employee continues working beyond the original period
without entering into another express contract.
190. 118 N.Y. 484 (I890).
191. See id.at 486.
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plaintiff originally was hired by the corporation, "provided that 'the
president, vice-president, secretary, surveyor and clerks shall respectively
hold their offices during the pleasure of the board of directors."" '
This provision, the court noted, permitted the corporation to dismiss the
plaintiff without notice and without any obligation of paying his salary
beyond the time actually served."
This case suggests, then, that as
early as 1850, corporations knew how to ensure that they could dismiss
employees at any time.
An 1881 case, Swift v. City of Nrew York, 94 provided an example
of another means by which employers could guarantee their right to
dismiss employees at will." 5 The plaintiff in Swift had been hired to
remove debris from the city's streets. 196 The employment contract,
which was entered into in 1874, provided that the plaintiff was to be paid
$800 per month "so long as his employment should continue."' 97 The
court interpreted this language as making the contract "terminable at the
pleasure" of the employer. 8 Although the plaintiff's position was not
what one would consider a middle-level management job, presumably the
language "so long as his employment should continue' 99 would be interpreted similarly regardless of the position held. These two cases
illustrate the approaches employers could take if they wanted to guarantee their ability to dismiss employees at any time with no liability. Thus,
decades before Martin was decided, New York employers had the ability
to contractually clarify that their employment contracts were at will.
They did not need the judiciary to change the law to achieve this.
Although employment at will was not suddenly adopted in the latenineteenth century in order to allow capitalists to assert control over
middle-level management employees, a significant change in the law that
had its greatest impact on middle-level management employees did occur
during this time. Feinman analyzed thirty decisions issued by New York
courts that addressed the duration of employment issue in the two
decades following Martin.20 0
While these cases do not support

192. Id. at 486-87.
193. Id. at 488.
194. 83 N.Y. 528 (1881).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 530.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Feinman, supra note 183, at 128-29. The cases analyzed by Feinman are: Marshall v.
Sackett & Wilhelms Co., 151 N.Y.S. 1045 (1915); Gressing v. Musical Instrument Sales Co., 154
N.Y.S. 420 (1915); Gibney v. National Jewelers' Bd. of Trade, 144 N.Y.S. 321 (1913); Crotty v.
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103

Feinman's conclusion that they extended the adoption of employment at
will, they do illustrate two important changes in employment contract

interpretation. Prior to this line of cases, courts often interpreted
payment terms stated by particular time periods as employment contracts
for that same duration.2 " In addition, some courts held that if the
parties expressly agreed to employment for a specific duration, the

contract was impliedly renewed for the same duration if the employee
continued working beyond the original term without an additional express
contract.2

2

Martin and its progeny eliminated these two doctrines. As

a result, salary stated by a time period was no longer interpreted as a
promise to employ during that same duration, and express contracts were

no longer considered to be impliedly renewed when the employee continued working beyond the original term.203 While these were impor-

Erie R.R. Co., 133 N.Y.S. 696 (1912); Mason v. New York Produce Exch., 111 N.Y.S. 163 (1908);
Aldrich v. New York Life Ins. Co., 105 N.Y.S. 493 (1907); Baker v. D. Appleton & Co., 95 N.Y.S.
125 (1905); Bennet v. Mahler, 85 N.Y.S. 669 (1904); Outerbridge v. Campbell, 84 N.Y.S. 1133
(1901); Potter v. New York, 68 N.Y.S. 1039 (1901); Hotchkiss v. Godkin, 71 N.Y.S. 629 (1901);
McIntosh v. Miner, 55 N.Y.S. 1074 (1899); Lichtenhein v. Fisher, 39 N.Y.S. 553 (1896);
Lichtenhein v. Fisher, 34 N.Y.S. 304 (1895), Feiber v. Home Silk Mills, 143 N.Y.S. 1014 (Sup. Ct.
1913); Alger v. New York Post Graduate Medical Scb. and Hosp, 140 N.Y.S. 394 (Sup. Ct. 1913);
wood v. Miller, 138 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Donoghue v. City of Yonkers, 123 N.Y.S. 315
(Sup. Ct. 1910); Robinson v. Adolph Raudnitz Co., 123 N.Y.S. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Reitzfeld v.
Sobel, 114 N.Y.S. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Stein v. Kooperstein, 102 N.Y.S. 578 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Frank
v. Manhattan Maternity & Dispensary, 107 N.Y.S. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Summers v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
98 N.Y.S. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1906); Messenio v. Atchison T.& S.F. Ry. Co., 98 N.Y.S. 647 (Sup. Ct.
1905); Lertora v. Cent. Fruit Co., 87 N.Y.S. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Byme v. Weir, 78 N.Y.S. 1110
(Sup. Ct. 1902); Foreman v. Goldberg, 62 N.Y.S. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Copp v. Colorado Coal &
Iron Co., 46 N.Y.S. 542 (City Ct. 1897); Shaff v. Schlachetzky, 70 N.Y.S. 1133 (1901); Laughlin
v. Manson, 120 N.Y.S. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
201. The decision in Martin acknowledged that lower court decisions differed on whether
payment specified by a certain time period created a contract for that same time period. Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416,417 (N.Y. 1895).
202. See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text, which discusses Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26
N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1891); see also Huntingdon v. Claffin, 38 N.Y. 182 (1868).
203. See, e.g., Gibney v. National Jewelers' Bd. of Trade, 144 N.Y.S. 321 (1913) (reversing a
lower court's decision that plaintiff's employment was not a hiring at will, and finding instead that
"it is established by a strong preponderance ofthe evidence that plaintiff's employment was a hiring
at will; his salary being calculated on a semimonthly basis. He had a right to leave and the
defendant had a right to discharge him at any time:); Stein v. Kooperstein, 102 N.Y.S. 578, (Sup.
Ct. 1907) (reversing lower court's ruling that plaintiffhad been unlawfully discharged, and referring
to the rule that "a hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an
indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed
for whatever time the party may serve."); Frank v. Manhattan Maternity & Dispensary, 107 N.Y.S.
404, (Sup. Ct. 1907) (reversing lower court's ruling that plaintiff had been unlawfully discharged,
and noting that "[V]here a contract of hiring is general or indefinite in its terms, it is prima facie
a hiring at will:); Summers v. Phenix Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.S. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (where the court,
citing Martin, held "[A] hiring at so much a year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring,
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tant changes, they were not the radical changes suggested by Feinman.
One can not know with certainty the true motivations of the
judiciary in effecting change in legal doctrine. It may be the case that
the courts that made these changes to contract interpretation were
motivated out of a desire to support the capitalist class' wishes to
maximize control over its work force. However, since employers had
already possessed the ability to ensure dismissal at any time through
recognized contract doctrines, Feinman's explanation does not seem to
be a convincing one. A more likely explanation is that offered by
Andrew Morriss.2 °4 Morriss, who like Feinman concluded that employment at will was adopted in the late-nineteenth century, argued that
courts readily adopted the doctrine because it served a useful gatekeeper
function that kept cases from going to trial? 5 Although this article
concluded that employment at will was not suddenly adopted during the
late-nineteenth century, Morriss' gatekeeper theory may explain why the
courts initiated the two changes in contract interpretation described
above.20 6 By refusing to equate salary terms with duration and by
refusing to recognize the implied renewal of express contracts, the courts
eliminated many potential disputes regarding the parties' intent.20 7 As
a result, a contract for a specific duration would no longer be recognized
absent evidence that the parties had expressly agreed to such a duration.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of New York law, from colonial times to the
and such a hiring is a hiring at will, and may be terminated at any time by either party.'. For a
further discussion regarding the court's refusal to recognize a salary stated in annual terms as a
guarantee of employment for the length ofthat period, see Gressing v. Musical Instrument Sales Co.,
154 N.Y.S. 420 (Sup. Ct. 1915), rev'd on othergrounds, 118 N.E. 627 (N.Y. 1918); Alger v. New

York Post Graduate Medical Sch. & Hosp., 140 N.Y.S. 394 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Donoghue v. City of
Yonkers, 123 N.Y.S. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Copp v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., 46 N.Y.S. 542 (City

Ct 1897).
204. Andrew P. MorrissExplodingMyths:AnEmpiricalandEconomic Reassessment ofthe Rise
Of Employment at-Will, 59 MO. L. REv. 679 (1994).
205. Id. at 696.

206. See id.
By shifting the initial inquiry to the issue of contract duration, courts gave themselves a
gatekeeper through which they could control the exercise ofjury discretion. The rise of

the at-will rule was not, therefore, the response of a compliant judiciary to the demands
of its capitalist masters. It was the development of an institutional mechanism which
enabled courts to control cases through shifting claims away from juries where judges did

not view the juries as reliable.
Id.
207. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/2

30

Ballam: The Development of the Employment At Will Rule Revisited: A Chall

19951

Employment At Will Revisited: A Challenge To Its Origins

nineteenth century, and historical evidence regarding working relationships in the dominant types of labor illustrates that New York has
always followed the employment at will doctrine. Further, the doctrine
was not the creation of a late-nineteenth century judiciary intent on
creating a favorable legal climate for business development. However,
to conclude that employment at will was not the creation of the judiciary
does not negate this article's opening quote, that "legal doctrine ... is

strongly influenced by economic conditions."2 8 If one accepts the
conclusion that employment at will always was the rule in New York,
one must still inquire as to why New York practice differed so dramatically from English law. When the original thirteen colonies were
founded, they adopted much of their law from the English," 9 or at
least the colonists' recollection and understanding of English law.21
Why, then, did New York fail to adopt the English rule of annual
hirings? The likely explanation is rooted in economics.1 Economic
conditions in the North American British colonies were very different
from those in England that gave rise to the annual hiring rule.212
While early nineteenth century England was characterized by a labor
surplus and a shortage of land, the colonies were characterized by a labor
shortage and an abundant supply of cheap land? 3 English employers
benefitted from the annual hiring rule because it ensured that they would
not keep someone on their payroll during the slack seasons only to have
them leave prior to the beginning of the busy seasons.214 English
employees benefitted from the rule for the reverse reason; employers
would not be able to hire them for the busy season and cast them off
during the slack times?" English communities also benefitted from
the rule.2 6 Because of the English poor laws, discharged employees,
who could not easily obtain other jobs217 or land of their own because

208. Feinman, supra note 183, at 135.
209. Feinman, supra note 183, at 122.
AND PEOPLE INCOLONIAL AMERiCA xi (1992). Very few of the
210. PEmER C. HOPPER, LAWY

early colonists were lawyers, and thus, the law they brought with them was based on their
recollection of legal practices and customs. Id.
211. Feinman, supra note 183, at 131.
212. Sanford M. Jacoby, The Durationof IndefiniteEmployment Contractsin the United States
andEngland, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 86-91 (1982).
213. See id. at 95.
214. Id. at 90.

215. See id. at 95-102; Feinman, supra note 183, at 119-22.
216. Feinman, supra note 183, at 120.

217. See Jacoby, supra note 212, at 90.
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of the shortage of property,2"' became charges on their community and
the communities bore the brunt of supporting them.2 t9 The annual
hiring rule, then, served a number of interests in England.
However, these same factors were not in operation in the colonies.
Discharged employees easily found other jobs due to the labor shortage,
and the abundance of free land also made it much easierfor the colonists
to become property owners? 0 In addition, due to the high wages
attributable to the labor shortage, employers did not want to make longterm commitments to their employees unless they were lower-cost indentured servants or slaves who basically worked for room and board.
Further, the rate of poverty in the colonies was not as high as in
England, and many of the poor women and children who were unable to
work were forced into indentured servitude?2' Thus, although in some
of the colonies the poor laws made the respective communities responsible for paupers who had resided there for at least one year,' the pressures on communities to care for the poor were not as great during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as they were in England. Therefore,
the economic conditions in the colonies militated against the adoption of
the English annual hiring rule.
Certainly the judiciary has played an important role in shaping U.S.
law. There also is substantial evidence to suggest that at times the
judiciary did help to shape the law in such a way as to create a favorable
environment for business development.?'
However, scholars
examining legal history need to be wary of reaching conclusions based
only on an examination of a few cases, or on reaching conclusions
without examining the non-legal historical evidence regarding actual
practices. An examination limited to the Davis, Adams, Martin, and
post-Martin cases, like the one that Feinman did, could reasonably lead
to the conclusion that New York courts suddenly adopted employment
at will in the late-nineteenth century in an attempt to protect capital from

218. See Jacoby, supra note 212, at 90-91.
219. See Jacoby,supra note 212, at 91.
220. See Richard B. Sheridan, The DomesticEconomy, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA 43,4344 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., 1984).
221. See generally FAYE E. DUDDEN, SERVING WOMEN:HoUSEHOLD SERVICE INNINETEENTHCENTURY Am RICA49-51 (1983); PAUL W. GATES, THE FARMER'S AGE: AGRICULTURE 1815-1860,
at 274-75 (1960); RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVRNMENT AND LABOR INEARLY AMERICA 16 (1946).
222. For information on U.S. poor laws, see MORRIS, supra note 221, at 14-16; MARCUS W.
JERNEGAN. LABORING AND THE DEPENDENT CLASSES IN COLONIAL AMiERICA, 1607-1783, at 55
(1931); George Daitsnan, Labor and the "Welfare State" in Early New York, 4 LAB. HIST. 248
(1963).
223. Feinman, supra note 183, at 132-34.
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middle-level managers. However, a more in-depth analysis of the
employment law of New York's colonial days through the nineteenth
century, in tandem with the historical evidence regarding employment
practices, would clearly lead to a very different conclusion.
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